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Abstract
 Contents of indexicals and how they are expressed are 
discussed in the present paper.  Kaplan's (1989) analysis of 
indexicals, in particular, his distinction among the utterer, the 
agent, and the referent of a token of ºI" (Corazza et al.  2001) is 
closely examined to clarify the uniqueness of an utterance which 
includes it.  It will be claimed that the uniqueness lies in the 
fact the utterer is identified and referred to as the agent of the 
present instance of discourse in Benveniste's (1973) sense, not as 
an individual in the world.  That is, the utterer is not specified in 
terms of her/his particularities which distinguish her/him from 
others in the world, but in terms of her/his speech or inscription 
of a token in the present instance of discourse.  This causes the 
utterer her/himself to be highlighted.  To clarify this uniqueness of 
the utterance with a token of ºI", a short conversational exchange 
from the movie Sommersby is examined, and the utterance with 
an indexical is compared with equivalent utterances with a co-
referring proper name and a co-referring definite description.  The 
complexities of the relationship among the utterer,  the 
agent, and the referent of a token of ºI" are also described in 
discussing the so-called answering machine paradox and relevant 
cases.  Furthermore, the analysis of different entities of a token of 
ºI" is extended to other pure indexicals such as ºyou", ºhere", and 
ºnow", in which the hearer/place/time is distinguished from the 
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agent(addressee)/spatial location/temporal location of the present 
instance of discourse.  
Key words: indexicals, personal pronouns, deixis, Kaplan, 
Benveniste
1.  Introduction 
 In the present paper I explain a unique way in which 
the contents of the personal pronouns ºI" and ºyou" are 
determined.  These pronouns are indexicals1 (Kaplan 1989) 
and the content of each token is determined by contextual 
factors.  Adopting the distinction among the utterer, the agent, 
and the referent of the personal pronoun ºI", which is clarified by 
Corazza et al.  (2001), I explain how the referent of the pronoun 
ºI" is determined through the identification of the agent.  I claim 
that the referent of the personal pronoun ºI" is determined without 
resorting to a person's uniqueness as having a particular name or 
particular features; it is rather specified in terms of the utterance 
or inscription.  I extend this analysis to the personal pronoun 
ºyou".  I assert that this unique way of identifying the referent 
of ºI" and ºyou" contributes to the interpretation of the sentence, 
which can be different from the interpretation of an equivalent 
sentence with a co-referring proper name or definite description.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, I 
 1 I could use the term ºdeixes" rather than ºindexicals" for the arguments 
in the present paper because I only analyze pure indexicals.  However, since 
I start my argument by explaining Kaplan's framework, I use ºindexicals" 
throughout the paper.
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introduce Kaplan's (1989) concept of indexicals, and explain the 
generally accepted view that the truth/falsity judgment of a 
sentence with an indexical expression coincides with that of an 
equivalent sentence with a co-referring proper name or definite 
description.  In Section 3, a short conversational exchange from a 
movie script is examined to show that the judgment of the truth/
falsity can differ depending on how the referent is identified, i.e., 
whether it is referred to by an indexical expression, a proper name, 
or a definite description.  To explain this difference, I examine how 
the referent of the personal pronoun ºI" is determined (in Section 4), 
and explain the distinction among the utterer, the agent, and the 
referent of the personal pronoun ºI", which Corazza et al.  (2001) 
clarify.  In this section I explain the answering machine paradox 
(Sidelle 1991) and the case of a post-it note (Corazza et al.  2001).  I 
claim different judgments of seemingly equivalent sentences are 
caused by distinctive ways of referent identification, where the 
referent is identified in terms of the present discourse, or of the 
world in which it exists.  A short conclusion follows.  
2.  Pronouns, proper names, and definite descriptions 
2.  1 Personal pronouns as indexicals
 It is generally assumed, since Kaplan (1989: 489), that personal 
pronouns are indexicals along with demonstrative pronouns 
such as ºthat" and ºthis", adverbs such as ºhere", ºnow", and 
ºtomorrow", and adjectives such as ºactual" and ºpresent".  Among 
these indexicals Kaplan identifies two types, true demonstratives 
(ºhe", ºshe", ºthat", etc.) and pure indexicals (ºI", ºhere", ºnow", 
etc.).  A referent of true demonstratives is fixed by the speaker's 
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demonstrations or intentions, whereas a referent of pure indexicals 
does not depend on such demonstrations or intentions.  For 
example, the character of ºI" determines the content of each of its 
tokens to be the speaker producing it, where a contextual factor is 
sufficient to determine the content.  
 Now let us examine some problematic cases of the second-
person pronoun ºyou".  The personal pronoun ºyou" is a pure 
indexical, and the character of ºyou" determines the content of 
each of its tokens to be the person being addressed.  However, as 
the following example shows, a contextual factor is not sufficient 
to determine the content; for different people to be referred to 
by the token of ºyou", different characters of ºyou", such as the 
character of ºyou1" and that of ºyou2" should be posited, or context 
change in the middle of the sentence should be allowed.
(1) You, you, but not you, are dismissed.  (Levinson 1983: 66) 
 The following example shows another problematic case:
(2) You can never tell which sex they are nowadays.  (Levinson 
1983: 66) 
 The referent(s) of ºyou" is/are not a particular person or a 
particular group of people who is/are identified by contextual 
factors.  The pronoun ºyou" in this sentence is generally described 
as generic ºyou", and the referents of its token are people in 
general.  This suggests necessity for different characters of ºyou", i.e., 
the character of specific ºyou" and that of non-specific, or generic, 
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ºyou".
 Another related issue is whether or not a contextual factor is 
sufficient enough to determine the content of generic ºyou".  Since 
the referents of ºyou" in (2) don't seem to be people on the 
earth in general, a certain kind of specification of the group of 
people is involved.  That is, the referents of a token of generic 
ºyou", and, more generally, non-specific plural ºyou", are people 
of a contextually relevant group, such as those in the speaker's 
community.  This is just as the referents of ºeveryone" are all 
people of a contextually relevant group, rather than the entire 
population of the world (cf.  Back 1994, Recanati 2004).  The 
contextually relevant group for a token of non-specific plural ºyou" 
does not seem to be specified only by a contextual factor.  That is, 
who the addresser and the addressee are, and what the time and 
place of the utterance are do not specify the contextually relevant 
group for a token of ºyou".
 Using the concept of a domain of discourse, Gauker (2003: 11-
12) explains the contextually relevant group in terms of which 
referents of ºeveryone" are specified.  Imagine a lecturer says 
utterance (3a) at the beginning of the lecture.  If the domain 
of discourse is students who are still enrolled in a course, the 
sentence means that every student who is still enrolled in the 
course is present.  If the domain of discourse is students who have 
been attending recently, the sentence means that every student 
who has been attending recently is present.  Similarly the relevant 
group for a token of plural ºyou" in (3b) may be specified in 
terms of a domain of discourse, either as the students who are still 
enrolled in the course or those who have been attending recently.  
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(3) a.  Everyone is present.  (Gauker 2003: 11) 
 b.  All of you are present.
 So plural or generic ºyou" in these cases does not seem to 
be a pure indexical: the referents of its token are not determined 
automatically by a contextual factor as the referents of pure 
indexicals are claimed to be (cf.  Perry 1997, 2001).  Plural or 
generic ºyou" is not a true demonstrative, either.  Obviously there 
is no demonstration involved in identifying its referents.  The 
referents of tokens of plural or generic ºyou" do not seem to 
be determined by the speaker's intention, either, if we take the 
speaker's intention as what Corazza et al.  (2001: 16) call the 
speaker's individuative intention: ºthe intention a speaker has to 
identify/speak about a given item".  Even in the case in which a 
specific group of individuals is referred to by ºyou", the speaker 
does not necessarily have an individuative intention to identify 
this group.  Quite often the speaker refers to people in general 
in her/his community by generic ºyou" without realizing that s/
he limits the scope of people in this way.  The lecturer in (3b) 
might mean that the students who have been attending recently 
are present without being conscious that s/he excludes from the 
referents of ºyou" those who are still enrolled in the course but 
have not been attending recently.    
 It is still reasonable to start an argument assuming that the 
character of the singular first-person pronoun ºI" and the character 
of the singular second-person pronoun ºyou" determine the content 
of each of their tokens, and contextual factors are generally 
sufficient to determine it.  
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2.2 Pronouns and co-referring proper names and definite 
descriptions
 Let us imagine the following scenario.  A speaker, John Smith, 
tells his colleague that he is sick, and goes home.  This colleague 
tells a secretary that he (= John Smith) is sick.  Later, when asked 
why the department meeting has been cancelled, the secretary 
says that the head of the department is sick.  In this scenario, the 
singular first-person pronoun ºI" (in (4a)), the proper name of 
ºJohn Smith" (in (4b)), and the definite description of ºthe head of 
the department" (in (4c)) refer to one and the same person, and 
these three utterances (4a-4c) are all true.
(4) a.  I am sick.
 b.  John Smith is sick.  
 c.  The head of the department is sick.  
 That is, equivalent sentences with the co-referring first person 
pronoun, proper name, and definite description express one and the 
same state of affairs.    
 We need some caution in analysing proper names and definite 
descriptions.  It is well accepted, since Kripke (1980: 61-63), that, 
in modal sentences, substituting a co-referring description for 
a proper name can change truth-value.  The following pair of 
sentences illustrates this point: 
(5) a. Aristotle might not have gone into pedagogy.
 b. The teacher of Alexander might not have gone into 
pedagogy.  
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 Since Aristotle might have chosen a different course of life, the 
utterance in (5a) is true.  However, since the person who did not 
go into pedagogy could not have been the teacher of Alexander, 
the utterance in (5b) is false.  The standard explanation of possible 
world semantics is that the description substituted for the proper 
name is not a rigid designator, i.e., does not denote the same object 
in every possible world in which that object exists.
 Although Kripke (1972[1980]: 11-12) does not accept it, the 
difference between rigidity of a proper name and non-rigidity of 
a definite description in (5a) and (5b) can be explained in terms 
of scope: names are ºscopeless" with respect to modal operator, 
while definite descriptions are not.  This is why (6a) and (6b) are 
equivalent intuitively, while (7a) and (7b) are not: 
(6) a. It is necessary that Aristotle is F.
 b. Concerning Aristotle, it is necessary that he is F.  
(7) a. It is necessary that the teacher of Alexander is F.
 b. Concerning the teacher of Alexander, it is necessary that 
he is F2.  
 Gluer and Pagin (2006) give an alternative explanation to 
rigidity and non-rigidity.  They claim that simple singular terms, 
including proper names, occur referentially in the contexts 
of ordinary modal expressions.  However, these contexts are 
intensional with respect to other types of expression.  Because 
 2 See Gluer and Pagin (2006: 509-510) for the details of this analysis.
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of this, the sentence (5a) is true, if and only if, what ºAristotle" 
actually refers to, in some possible world, did not go into 
pedagogy.  The sentence (5b), on the other hand, is true if, and 
only if, what ‘Alexander' actually refers to is such that, in some 
possible world, his teacher did not go into pedagogy.
 However, since our targets are equivalent non-modal sentences 
with the co-referring first person pronoun, proper name, and 
definite description, the distinction between rigidity and non-
rigidity does not affect the judgment of truth/falsity of the 
utterances.
 Another related complication concerns the distinction between 
referential use and attributive use of the definite description.  The 
definite description in (4c) can be interpreted referentially and 
attributively (intensionally) (Donnellan 1966).  If we take ºthe 
head of the department" attributively, i.e., as ºthe head of the 
department̶whoever s/he is", the sentence does not express one 
and the same state of affairs as those in (4a) and (4b): there is 
a person, who is the current speaker or has a name, John Smith, 
and this person is sick.  Under the scenario, in which ºthe head 
of the department" is taken referentially, an equivalent reading is 
obtained: there is a person, who is the head of the department, and 
this person is sick.
 There is, however, something peculiar about the way the 
contents of the personal pronoun ºI" and ºyou" are determined.  Let 
us show this using a short conversational exchange in the movie 
Sommersby (1993).  
2.  ºAm I your husband?"
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 The setting for Sommersby is the U.S.  in the late 1870s, and 
a man, Jack Sommersby, who fought in the war, comes back to 
his wife, Laurel, after six years.  He does not behave as he used 
to, and Laurel starts to suspect that he is not her husband Jack 
Sommersby.  Before the war, when Jack and Laurel were together 
as a couple, Jack had been cold to Laurel and she felt that she 
was rejected by her husband.  With this ºnew" husband, who 
is warm and passionate, Laurel becomes happy and starts to 
love him.  Then he gets arrested for a murder Jack Sommersby 
committed during the war.  In the trial, a witness testifies that 
he is not Jack Sommersby, but rather Horace Townsend, which 
he denies.  To save him, Laurel also testifies that he is not Jack 
Sommersby.  Then he asks her a question as a cross-examiner:
(8) J: Am I your husband?
 L: (a long pause) Yes, you are.  
 J: Thank you.
 The question is what proposition is queried by the first 
speaker, asserted by the second speaker, and agreed by both 
speakers.  It is neither the proposition that Jack Sommersby is 
Laurel Sommersby's husband, which the second speaker doesn't 
assert, nor the one that Horace Townsend is Laurel Sommersby's 
husband, which the first speaker wouldn't query.  Korta and 
Perry (2007: 171) say an utterance ºI am I", in comparison with 
ºI am Joana", would not commit the speaker to have the name 
ºJoana".  However, what is happening in this case is more than 
that: if the speakers identify the referent of ºI" or ºyou" as the 
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bearer of either name, Jack Sommersby or Horace Townsend, there 
is not any proposition whose truth they can agree on.  That is, 
if we substitute ºI" for ºJack Sommersby" and ºyou" for ºHorace 
Townsend" using contextual factors, the altered dialogue (in (9)) 
does not make sense:  
(9) J: Is Jack Sommersby your husband?
 L: (a long pause) (??)Yes, Horace Townsend is.  
 J: (??)Thank you.
 What they seem to agree on is that a particular person is the 
husband of another particular person, and the former is identified 
not as the bearer of a name, Jack Sommersby or Horace Townsend, 
but as a particular person in this particular context/discourse, 
who is the addresser of the first sentence and the addressee of 
the second sentence.  That is, when someone is identified through 
her/his act of speaking as the addresser, or her/his uptake of the 
utterance as the addressee, s/he is identified as a particular person 
who exists in a particular context/discourse, not as an individual 
with a unique name or particular features who exists in the world.  
 This seems to suggest that, contrary to the analysis of the 
sentences in (4) above, equivalent sentences with the co-referring 
first-person pronoun, proper name, and definite description do not 
express the same meaning.  Let us compare the following three 
sentences: 
(10)a. I am Laurel's husband.  
 b. Horace Townsend is Laurel's husband.  
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 c. The man charged with murder is Laurel's husband.  
 As we said above, there are two interpretations for the definite 
description ºthe man charged with murder" in (10c).  If taken 
referentially, the sentence means that there is a particular person 
and he is charged with murder, and he is Laurel's husband.  If 
taken attributively, the sentence means that the person who is 
charged with murder̶you might not know him or who he is̶
is Laurel's husband.  As Donellan (1966) observes, in the case of 
referential use, even if this particular person is not in fact charged 
with murder, say, he is a policeman who happens to stand by the 
charged person, the sentence can be true as long as this person is 
referred to.  
 The sentence with a proper name in (10b) is taken only 
referentially.  The sentence means that there is a particular person 
and he is the bearer of the name Horace Townsend, and he is 
Laurel's husband.  What if this person's name is not in fact Horace 
Townsend, but, say, as he claims, Jack Sommersby? If we take this 
case as analogous to Donnellan's referential use, we should say that 
the sentence can be true as long as this person is referred to.  The 
sentence with the personal pronoun ºI" in (10a) is taken only 
referentially as well: the sentence means that there is a particular 
person and he is the addresser of the current utterance, and he is 
Laurel's husband.
 In the referential uses of definite descriptions and the use 
of proper names, there are cases in which a particular person is 
identified as a person with certain features or a name, but such 
identification is not accurate: the description is not true of the 
person referred to, or the name is not her/his name.  There don't 
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seem to be any analogous cases for ºI" and ºyou".  If a person does 
not utter an utterance, s/he cannot use the pronoun ºI" to refer to 
her/himself as the addresser.  Similarly, if a person does not hear 
an utterance, s/he cannot be referred to by the pronoun ºyou".  A 
possible gap between a particular person and a definite description, 
or between a particular person and a proper name for her/him 
seems to be a gap between a particular person and identification of 
this person by the name or description.  Such identification is done 
through physical, social, and other features which characterize a 
person, or a unique name which indicates a bearer of the name.   
 In the case of referring to a particular person by a definite 
description or a proper name, there is a certain kind of 
ºdescription" involved in the identification of the person, and 
this seems to affect the judgment of the truth/falsity of the 
utterance.  The sentences in (10b) and (10c), for example, do not 
simply mean that a particular person is the husband of another 
particular person, but that a particular person identified as a 
bearer of the name Horace Townsend is the husband of another 
particular person identified as a bearer of the name Laurel (in (10b)), 
or a particular person identified as a man charged with murder 
is the husband of another particular person identified as a bearer 
of the name Laurel (in (10c)).  It is for this reason that what the 
following sentences express is a contradiction in a straightforward 
sense: 
(11)a. Horace Townsend is not Horace Townsend,  
 b. The man charged with murder is not charged with murder, 
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To avoid a contradiction, ºHorace Townsend" and ºthe man 
charged with murder" in the subject position should be interpreted 
as ºthe person we know as ‘Horace Townsend'" or ºthe person you 
identify as ‘Horace Townsend'" (in (11a)), or as ºthe person who 
is believed to be ‘the man charged with murder'" or ºthe person 
you identify as ‘the man charged with murder'" (in (11b)).  This 
can be indicated more clearly by quotation marks:
(12)a. ºHorace Townsend" is not Horace Townsend.   
 b. ºThe man charged with murder" is not charged with 
murder.   
 If so, the identity as a bearer of the name Horace Townsend 
makes a significant contribution to the interpretation of the 
sentence in (10b), and the identification of the person in terms of 
his connection to the murder case, rather than other features of 
him, makes a significant contribution to the interpretation of the 
sentence in (10c).  
 There doesn't seem to be an equivalent gap between a 
particular person and the personal pronouns ºI" and ºyou" to refer 
to the person.  When a particular person is referred to as the 
addresser or the addressee, a person is not ºdescribed" in any sense, 
such as having particular features or being a bearer of a name as 
her/his identity, but simply referred to as a unique individual who 
is currently addressing or being addressed.  This is, the personal 
pronouns ºI" and ºyou" are used to refer to a particular person at 
the time and place of the utterance through her/his act of speaking 
or hearing/uptake.  
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 According to the analysis proposed, let us interpret the 
original conversation in (8), which we have here again: 
(13)J: Am I your husband?
 L: (a long pause) Yes, you are.   
 J: Thank you.
 The first utterance, in which the speaker refers to himself by 
ºI", can be interpreted as the question of whether or not he is the 
hearer's husband because of what he is rather than who he is or 
how he is described.  The speaker of the second utterance asserts 
that the person, whom she currently addresses, is her husband not 
because who he is or how he is described, but because of what he 
is.
 In the same vein, we can say the sentence in (14a) but cannot 
say the one in (14b): 
(14)a. Even if Jack Sommersby is not Jack Sommersby, I love 
him.
 b. ＊Even if you are not you, I love you.
 When a particular person is referred to by a proper name, s/
he is referred to as a bearer of the name.  So the sentence in (14a) 
means that there exists a particular person, who is identified 
incorrectly as Jack Sommersby but is referred to nevertheless, 
and the speaker loves him.  The sentence in (14b), on the other 
hand, does not make sense.  By the pronoun ºyou" in the subject 
of the subordinate clause, the hearer is identified as a particular 
－ 16－
person through her/his hearing and uptake of the utterance, and, 
therefore, referred to as a unique individual who exists at the 
time and place of the utterance.  The speaker, however, denies, in 
the predicate, that this unique individual referred to is a unique 
individual addressed by the present utterance.  It is a contradiction, 
and denies in the predicate part what one indicates in the subject 
part.  
 So far I have clarified how a particular individual is identified 
and referred to by the personal pronoun ºI" or ºyou", a proper 
name, and a definite description.  I claimed that the different ways 
a person is identified and referred to by each of these expressions 
affect the interpretation of the utterance about the person.  When 
a particular individual is identified by a particular name, s/he 
is referred to as the person whose identity is specified by the 
name s/he has, and, therefore, her/his identity as the bearer of 
the name affects the interpretation of the utterance.  When a 
particular person is identified by the singular definite description, 
s/he is referred to as the person who has a particular feature 
captured by the description, and, therefore, the description given 
to her/him affects the interpretation of the utterance.  When a 
particular person is identified by the personal pronoun ºI" or 
ºyou", on the other hand, s/he is identified as a person who is 
uttering or hearing the present utterance, where no ºdescription" is 
involved.  The interpretation of the utterance, therefore, is affected 
by nothing other than the referent being a particular individual 
who is the addresser or the addressee of the present utterance at 
a particular time and place.  That is, while to refer to a person 
by a proper name or a singular definite expression is to indicate 
－ 17－
the person by means of a given identity or description, to refer 
to a person by the personal pronoun ºI" or ºyou" is to identify 
the person in terms of the discourse role as the addresser or the 
addressee, where the uniqueness of this person is indicated by her/
his utterance or uptake of the utterance.  
 This analysis agrees with Perry's (1977, 1979, 2000) observation 
that identifying oneself as the addresser by the first-person 
pronoun ºI" is distinct from identifying her/him as a particular 
person with a particular name or particular features, and, therefore, 
to think about oneself in the first-person way, i.e., a de se attitude, 
cannot be reduced to a de dicto or de re attitude (cf.  Ninan 2010: 
551).  Perry (1979) gives his experience of following a trail of sugar 
on a supermarket floor, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to 
tell him he was making a mess, without realizing that he was the 
shopper.  In that situation John Perry would have said utterance (15a) 
believing that the shopper was making a mess, but not utterance (15b) 
believing that he (=John Perry) was making a mess.   
(15)a. The shopper with the torn sack is making a mess.
 b. I am making a mess.
 Perry (1979) shows this analysis can be extended to other pure 
indexicals (ºyou", ºhere", and ºnow").
 In the following section, I try to clarify what makes referring 
to a particular person by ºI" or ºyou" so unique on the basis of the 
analysis of ºI" by Corazza et al.  (2001).
3.  ºWho is I?"
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 Corazza et al.  (2001: 1-2) analyse the personal pronoun ºI" 
by adopting Kaplan's account of pure indexicals.  They explain 
Kaplan's account in the following way.  The character of ºI" is 
represented by a function that takes as argument the agent, and 
gives as value the referent.  The logic of indexical terms forces the 
distinction between the utterer, the contextual parameters (agent, 
time, place and possible world) and the referents (contents).  As 
utterances are features of the world and hence occur in time, it is 
not possible to provide a semantic evaluation of utterances.  To 
overcome this, it is required to assess the abstract notion of a 
sentence-in-context.  The agent is, therefore, an essentially logical 
notion, a contextual parameter filling the arguments of character, 
and giving us the referent of the indexical, and, as such, is 
logically distinct from the notion of an utterer.   
 Corazza et al.  (2001: 2) then claim that Kaplan assumes that 
the utterer and the agent will always be identical and hence that 
the referent of ºI" will always be the utterer.  This account of 
indexical reference, they argue, appears to assume two identity 
statements; that the agent is the referent (from the character 
of ºI"), and that the utterer is the agent.  This account can be 
represented in the following way (Corazza et al.  2001: 2): 
 While the utterer and referent are parts of the material world, 
Determination of agent Determination of referent
f = (The character of ºI")
The utter is the agent f: agent → referent
－ 19－
the agent is a logical parameter, playing the role of taking us from 
the language to the world.  The agent-utterer identity ensures that, 
for every token of ºI", the contextual parameter of the agent is 
identified with the utterer, the individual who uses the token.  The 
character of ºI" then completes the task by returning the utterer 
(= the agent) as the referent of the token.  The character of 
ºhere" and ºnow" can also be represented in the same way.  In each 
case, the character of the indexical is a function from a contextual 
parameter to the referent of the expression.  
 This idea is questioned by Sidelle (1991), who introduces what 
he calls the Answering Machine Paradox.  According to Sidelle, 
since the character of ºI", ºhere", and ºnow" is a function from a 
contextual parameter to the referent of the expression, utterances 
of ºI", ºhere", and ºnow" refer, respectively, to the utterer, the 
location of utterance, and the time of utterance.  Since the sentence 
ºI am not here now" is uttered truly if and only if the utterer is 
not at the location of utterance at the time of utterance, and an 
utterer is always at the location of the utterance at the time of 
utterance, the sentence ºI am not here now" may never be uttered 
truly.  This conclusion is at odds with the intuition that there 
are true instances of the sentence ºI am not here now" when it is 
uttered on a telephone answering machine̶hence the Answering 
Machine Paradox̶and written on a post-it note and stuck on an 
office door when its inhabitant is not in residence.
 According to Corazza et al.  (2001), this so-called ºparadox" can 
be seen as a puzzle about the referent of ºnow".  In the Kaplanean 
framework, the referent of ºnow" is the time of the utterance, 
but, for the answering machine or the post-it note to serve any 
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purpose, ºnow" must refer to the time at which a message is heard 
or read.  Sidelle claims that an utterance can be deferred: the 
utterance takes place when the message is heard by the hearer or 
read by the reader (the decoding time) not when it is recorded or 
written (the encoding time).  
 Corazza et al.  (2001) then posit two cases, where we cannot 
explain a puzzle by hypothesizing deferred communication, i.e., a 
message is heard or read at a deferred time.  
 The first puzzle is explained as follows.  Imagine Joe is not in 
his office one day and Ben notices that a number of students keep 
approaching his door and knocking.  They then stand around and 
look bemused for a while before leaving.  Taking pity on these 
poor students wasting their time, Ben decides to attach his ºI am 
not here today" note to Joe's door.  The trick works; the students, 
instead of knocking and waiting, take one look at the note and 
then leave.  To what does ºI" refer? At the moment a student looks 
at the note, Corazza et al.  claim, it would be strange to deny that 
it refers to Joe.  
 The second scenario comes from Predelli (1998a, 1998b).  Imagine 
Joe, before leaving home at 8.00 AM, writes the following note to 
his partner: ºAs you can see I am not at home now.  Please meet 
me in six hours in my office".  Joe, expecting his partner to return 
at 5.00 PM, intends for her to meet him at 11.00 PM.  If ºnow" in 
Joe's note refers to the time at which it is read, then Joe's partner 
will specify the time at which she reads the note.  If, as expected, 
Joe's partner comes home at 5.00 PM and reads the note, ºnow" 
will indicate 5.00 PM and Joe's partner will meet Joe in his office 
at 11.00 PM.  
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 Predelli then asks us to consider the scenario in which Joe's 
partner is unexpectedly delayed and doesn't return until 7.00 
PM.  ºNow" in Joe's note should indicate the time when Joe's 
partner reads the note̶7.00 PM.  Predelli argues that Joe's partner, 
being aware that she was expected home at 5.00 PM, will not 
meet Joe at 1.00 AM the following day, but will meet him, as Joe 
expects, at 11.00 PM.  
 As for the first scenario, ºI" refers to Joe, and this is certainly 
what the students take it to refer to.  However, given that the 
character of ºI" states that it refers to the agent, and, on Kaplan's 
account, the agent is identical with the utterer, Joe must be the 
utterer if he is the referent.  As for the second scenario, where Joe's 
partner doesn't come home until 7.00 PM, ºnow" refers to 5.00 PM, 
rather than 7.00 PM, but on the Kaplanean account, ºnow" must be 
either at 8.00 AM, which is the encoding time, or at 7.00 PM, which 
is the decoding time.  
 Predelli claims that ºnow" in Joe's note does not always refer 
to the time Joe's message is read, it rather indicates the time Joe 
intended to specify.  When Joe wrote a message, he believed that 
his partner would come home at the usual time, and read the 
message then, i.e., at 5.00 PM.  So the decoding time that Joe meant, i.e., 
the time that he intended to specify by ºnow" is at 5.00 PM, rather 
than at 7.00 PM, which is the actual time when his partner comes 
home.
 This analysis, Corazza et al.  (2001) claim, can be applied to 
the first case.  ºI" in the ºI am not here today" note does not refer 
to the writer, Ben, but to the inhabitant of the office whose door 
the note is put on, Joe, because the writer intended it to refer to 
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Joe.  Corazza et al.  (2001: 8) use the following diagram to explain 
differences and similarities between Kaplan's and Predelli's analysis 
of indexicals: 
 Then Corazza et al.  quite rightly observe that, if Ben can refer 
to Joe purely by virtue of his having the intention to refer to 
Joe by ºI", it follows that ºI" can be used to refer to pretty much 
anyone, which is not true.  They propose to explain indexicals 
in appealing to convention: for any use of the personal indexical, 
the contextual parameter of the agent is conventionally given̶
given by the social or conventional setting in which the utterance 
takes place.  For instance, with ºnow", the setting or context in 
which it is used changes the time that the term refers to: if ºnow" 
is heard on an answering machine, we take the relevant time to 
be the time at which it is heard, and we arrive at the referent 
accordingly.  The following diagram shows the differences and 
similarities of analysis of indexicals among Kaplan, Predelli, and 
Corazza et al.: 
Determination of agent Determination of referent
Kaplan
Predelli
The utter is the agent
Intention determines 
the agent
f: agent → referent
f: agent → referent
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 The social or conventional setting in which the utterance 
takes place, however, does not always determine the time the 
term such as ºnow" and ºtoday" refers to.  As the examples in (16) 
show, there are two conventions about the referent of ºtoday" in 
recording a program and replaying it: ºtoday" is the day when a 
program is recorded or the day when it is replayed: 
(16)a. This program is being recorded today, Wednesday April 
1st, to be relayed next Thursday,
 b. This program was recorded on Wednesday April 1st to be 
relayed today3,
 Corazza et al.'s explanation is better than Predelli's in that 
determination of the agent is much more restricted, and their 
model does not allow the speaker's intention to make anyone the 
agent.  However, it doesn't seem to be the case that convention 
solely determines the agent of indexicals.  
 We might develop the argument about indexicals in a different 
 3 Fillmore (1975).
Determination of agent Determination of referent
Kaplan
Predelli
Corazza et al
The utter is the agent
Intention determines 
the agent
Convention determines 
the agent
f: agent → referent
f: agent → referent
f: agent → referent
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direction.  The issue might not so much rely on how a particular 
person or a particular spatial or temporal location is determined 
as the referent of an indexical, but how a particular person or a 
particular spatial or temporal location is referred to by an indexial, 
and what effect it makes on the interpretation of the utterance.  In 
particular we focus on how a particular individual is referred to 
by the pronoun ºI", and explain it by adopting a distinction among 
the utterer, the agent, and the referent.  
4.  The utterer, the agent, and the referent
 If, as Corazza et al.  claim, the utterer or writer of a token 
of ºI" does not have to be the agent, what is the agent?  How is 
a particular person identified as the agent and referred to?  A 
reasonable explanation of indexicals seems to be that the agent 
of a token of ºI" is a person who physically utters or inscribes 
the token, i.e., an utterer or writer of the token, and, therefore, 
a token of ºI" indicates an agent as the utterer or writer of the 
token.  However, as Corazza et al.  suggest, in certain circumstances, 
the agent of a token of ºI" is not the person who physically utters 
or inscribes the token.  In such a case, the referent is a person who 
is indicated as the agent of the token as the utterer or writer of the 
token.  That is, the referent of a token ºI" is identified through the 
agency of the token, i.e., through her/his actual or presumed act of 
speaking or inscribing the token.  Benveniste (1973: 218) explains 
this in saying ºI can only be identified by the instance of discourse 
that contains it and by that alone".  He continues: 
It[I] has no value except in the instance in which it is 
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produced.  But in the same way it is also as an instance of 
form that I must be taken; the form of I has no linguistic 
existence except in the act of speaking in which it is 
uttered.  There is thus a combined double instance in this 
process: the instance of I as referent and the instance of 
discourse containing I as the referee.  
 The referent of a token of indexicals is identified only in 
terms of a particular instance of utterance or inscription in 
which the token is included, which Benveniste calls ºthe instance 
of discourse".  In the cases of recorded messages, speeches 
in a play, post-it notes and others, the issue of what is the 
instance of discourse for a particular token of indexicals is not 
straightforward: the referent of a token should be identified 
through specification of the actual or presumed instance of 
discourse for the token.  Specification of the actual instance of 
discourse can be done by specifying its participants and spatio-
temporal location.  This is the direction Perry (1997, 2001) pursues.  
 Sidelle (1991), Predelli (1998a, 1998b) and Corazza et al.  (2002) 
clarify how specifying the instance of discourse for a particular 
token can be deferred, and how a complication occurs.  In written 
communication and in some types of spoken communication made 
possible by recording equipment, there is a gap between the time 
and place in which a speaker/writer utters/inscribes something and 
the time and place in which a hearer/reader interprets it.  Since 
a speaker/writer utters/inscribes something so that a particular 
hearer/reader can understand it, the instance of discourse in terms 
of which the referent of a token of indexicals is identified can be 
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either at the time and place in which the speaker/writer utters/
inscribes something, or at the time and place in which the hearer/
reader interprets it.  
 On the basis of this interpretation of indexicals, let us explain 
the cases of the Answering Machine Paradox in Sidelle (1991), the 
note to a partner in Predelli (1998a, 1998b), and the post-it note in 
Corazza et al.  (2001).
 In the case of a recorded message on an answering machine, 
ºI am not here now", the instance of discourse in terms of which 
tokens of ºI", ºhere", and ºnow" are interpreted is not at the time 
when the utterance was recorded, but at the time when the 
utterance is heard by a caller.  A particular person who recorded 
the utterance, usually a resident, is indicated as the agent of a 
token of ºI"; a particular place where the recording of the message 
is played, usually a house or office where the answering machine 
is, is indicated as the spatial location of a token of ºhere"; a 
particular time when the recorded message is heard, i.e., the time 
when a caller makes a call, is indicated as the temporal location 
of a token of ºnow".  So the utterance informs the caller that the 
inhabitant who s/he is trying to call is not at the house/office 
where the phone is at the time of calling.  
 In the case of the note to a partner which Predelli (1998a, 
1998b) explains, the instance of discourse in terms of which tokens 
of ºI/my/me", ºyou", ºhome", and ºnow" are interpreted is neither 
at the time when Joe wrote the note̶ºAs you can see I am not at 
home now.  Please meet me in six hours in my office"̶, i.e., at 8.00 
AM, nor at the time when his partner actually reads the note, i.e., at 7.00 
PM.  It is rather at the time when Joe believed his partner would 
－ 27－
read the note, i.e., at 5.00 PM, when she was expected home.  In a 
case of a written note which one leaves for another, the person 
who inscribed the note is indicated as the agent of a token of ºI/
my/me"; a person who the note was inscribed for, and actually 
reads it, is indicated as the agent of a token of ºyou"; the residence 
of the writer or the reader of the note is indicated as the spatial 
location of a token of ºhome"; a particular time when the note was 
inscribed by the writer, or is read by the reader, is indicated as the 
temporal location of a token of ºnow".  What Predelli shows is that, 
when there is an obvious gap between the time when the intended 
reader actually reads the note and the time when s/he is expected 
to read it, the latter is the time indicated as the temporal location 
of a token of ºnow".  This is because the writer wrote the note so 
that the intended reader would/could understand it, and the reader 
knows this, too.  It is, therefore, that Joe's partner would interpret 
the time indicated by the token of ºnow" as 5.00 PM, and meet Joe 
in his office at 11.00 PM.   
 In the case of the post-it note Corazza et al.  (2001) explain, 
the instance of discourse in terms of which tokens of ºI", ºhere", 
and ºtoday" are interpreted is not at the time and place where the 
writer inscribed the note ºI am not here today", but at the time 
and place where the note is read by students.  Since the writer's 
message is that he is not available on this day, the inhabitant of 
the office is indicated as the agent of a token of ºI"; the office on 
whose door the note is put is indicated as the spatial location of a 
token of ºhere", and the day in which the students read the note is 
indicated as the temporal location of a token of ºtoday".  In normal 
circumstances the writer who inscribes a note and is responsible 
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for the content of the inscription is indicated as the agent of a 
token of ºI", but this is not the case when Ben wrote the note of 
ºI am not here today" for Joe.  The person who is indicated as the 
agent of a token of ºI" is not the person who actually inscribed the 
note and is responsible for the content of the note.
 So far we have argued that the referent of a token of 
indexicals is identified only in term of the instance of discourse 
in which it is included and, when communication is deferred, as is 
in the case of written communication and some types of spoken 
communication by means of recording equipment, the instance of 
discourse is either the instance of the utterance or inscription of 
the token, or the instance of interpretation of the token.  Through 
the explication of indexicals, we have clarified three distinct 
entities of communication.  As Kaplan claims, there is a distinction 
among the utterer (speaker), the agent (addresser), and the 
referent of a token of ºI".  In a similar fashion, we can clarify three 
distinct entities for a token of ºyou", ºhere", and ºnow": the hearer, 
the agent (addressee), and the referent of a token of ºyou"; the 
place, the context, and the referent of ºhere"; the time, the context, 
and the referent of ºnow".  Just as a particular utterer/speaker is 
identified as the agent of a token of ºI", i.e., the addresser in the 
present instance of discourse, a particular hearer is identified as 
the agent of a token of ºyou", i.e., the addressee in the present 
instance of discourse.  Similarly, a particular place is identified 
as the spatial location of the present instance of discourse, and a 
particular time is identified as the context of the present instance 
of discourse.  
 The next step would be to specify how a particular utterer
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(speaker)/hearer/time/place is identified and referred to as the 
addresser/addressee/context of the instance of discourse.  Our 
particular interest lies in the way a particular utterer(speaker)/
hearer is identified and referred to as the addresser/addressee of 
the instance of discourse, which is different from the way in which 
a particular person is referred to by a definite description or a 
proper name, as we discussed in Section 2.  
 If the utterance ºI am I" is not a tautology, there must be two 
entities: one is referred to by the first token of ºI", and the other is 
referred to by the second token.  It seems that the speaker (utterer) 
of ºI am I" refers to her/himself by one token of ºI", and, by the 
other token, identifies her/himself as the agent, i.e., the addresser 
of the present instance of discourse.  In the case of the utterance 
with the subject of ºI", such as ºI am not here now" and ºI am your 
husband", the speaker (utterer) refers to her/himself as the agent 
of the token of ºI", i.e., the addresser.  Since the utterer is indicated 
and referred to as the addresser without any description of her/
him, the utterer her/himself as the addresser is highlighted.  In 
the case of the second-person pronoun ºyou", a particular hearer is 
indicated and referred to as the agent of a token of ºyou", i.e., the 
addressee of the present instance of discourse, and the hearer her/
himself as the addressee is highlighted.
 This interpretation is compatible with the analysis of the 
conversation exchange discussed in Section 2, which we have here 
again:
(17)J: Am I your husband?
 L: (a long pause) Yes, you are.  
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 J: Thank you.
 In the first utterance in (17), ºAm I your husband?", a 
particular speaker (utterer) identifies himself as the agent of a 
token of ºI", i.e., the addresser of the present instance of discourse, 
and queries if he is the husband of the hearer, who is identified 
as the agent of a token of ºyour", i.e., the addressee of the present 
instance of discourse.  In the second utterance, ºYes, you are", 
the hearer is identified as the agent of a token of ºyou", and the 
speaker (utterer) affirms that the hearer is her husband.  Since 
the utterer(speaker)/hearer is indicated and referred to as the 
addresser/addressee of the present instance of discourse, not as a 
person who has a particular name or features, the utterer(speaker)/
hearer him/herself as the addresser/addressee is highlighted, and 
the first utterer (speaker) is identified as the husband of the 
second utterer (speaker).   
 Let us examine again the distinction among the sentences 
with an indexical, a proper name, and a definite description in the 
subject position.
(18)a. I am Laurel's husband.  
 b. Horace Townsend is Laurel's husband.  
 c. The man charged with murder is Laurel's husband.  
 In (18a), the utterer(speaker) refers to himself as the addresser 
of the present instance of discourse, and asserts that he is the 
husband of a particular individual, who is a bearer of the name 
Laurel.  In (18b), the utterer(speaker) refers to a particular 
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individual, who is a bearer of the name Horace Townsend, and 
asserts that he is the husband of a particular individual, who is a 
bearer of the name Laurel.  In (18c), when taken referentially, the 
utterer(speaker) refers to a particular individual, who is charged 
with murder, and asserts that he is the husband of a particular 
individual, who is a bearer of the name Laurel.  Although the 
referents of ºI", ºHorace Townsend", and ºthe man charged with 
murder" can be the same person, each way of identifying and 
referring to the person is quite distinctive.  
 When the utterer(speaker) refers to himself by a token of ºI", 
what the speaker recognizes as himself, that is, as the addresser, 
seems to be highlighted, and, in an utterance like (18a), there 
typically occurs the identification of himself, say, as the husband 
of a particular individual, who is a bearer of the name Laurel.  In (18b) 
and (18c), on the other hand, the speaker refers to an individual 
in the world, and makes a different type of an identity claim.  In 
(18b), the speaker claims that the person who is a bearer of the 
name Horace Townsend and the husband of a bearer of the name 
Laurel are one and the same person.  In (18c), the speaker claims 
that the person who is described as a man charged with murder is 
identified as the husband of a bearer of the name Laurel.  
 These differences in the interpretation of ºI", ºHorace 
Townsend", and ºthe man charged with murder" affect the 
interpretation of the utterances.  The utterance ºI am Laurel's 
husband" in (18a) means that what the speaker recognizes as 
himself is identified as the husband of a particular person, who 
is a bearer of the name Laurel; the sense of the ºhusband" can be 
either an official husband or a husband in a spiritual sense.  In 
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the instance of discourse specified in the movie Sommersby, 
the utterance is affirmed true and we also feel it is true: the 
relationship between the utterer(speaker) and Laurel is such that 
the former is the latter's husband in a spiritual sense.  
 The utterance ºHorace Townsend is Laurel's husband" in 
(18b) means that two individuals, a bearer of the name Horace 
Townsend and the husband of a bearer of the name Laurel are 
one and the same person.  In the circumstances specified by 
the movie Sommersby, the utterance is probably false because 
Horace Townsend is not married to Laurel.  Interpreting the word 
ºhusband" in the sense of a spiritual husband is more difficult than 
interpreting ºhusband" in ºI am Laura's husband" in the sense of 
a spiritual husband because this is an identify claim of Horace 
Townsend and Laurel's husband.  
 The utterance ºThe man charged with murder is Laurel's 
husband" in (18c) means that the person who is described as a 
man charged with murder is identified as the husband of a bearer 
of the name Laurel.  In the circumstances specified by the movie 
Sommersby, the utterance is probably false because this person 
is not married to Laurel.  Interpreting the word ºhusband" in the 
sense of a spiritual husband is much more difficult because the 
description of ºthe man charged with murder" does not imply 
anything unique about this person which qualifies him to be 
Laura's husband in a spiritual sense.
 This analysis can be extended to the indexical ºyou".  In using 
ºyou", the utterer (speaker) refers to the hearer as the agent 
of a token of ºyou", i.e., the addressee of the present instance 
of discourse, where the hearer her/himself as the addressee is 
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highlighted.  Let us show this using the following example:
(19)You are my son.  
 This utterance comes from the movie Blood Diamond, where a 
Sierra Leonean man, Solomon, is trying to rescue his young son, 
Dia, who has been abducted by rebels and brainwashed to be a 
rebel fighter.  Dia does not recognize his father.  Desperately trying 
to get him back from the rebel fighters, Solomon says utterance 
(19) to his son to remind him what he is.  This utterance can be 
interpreted as the case in which the utterer (speaker) refers to the 
hearer as the addressee of the present instance of discourse, and 
identifies him as the son of the speaker.  This meaning, i.e., somone 
is identified as the son of the speaker in the present instance of 
discourse, is not expressed by equivalent sentences with a co-
referring proper name or a co-referring definite description:
(20)a. Dia is my son.
 b. One of the rebel fighters is my son.
 In (20a), the utterer (speaker) claims that the person who is 
a bearer of the name Dia and the son of the speaker are the same 
person.  In (20b), the utterer (speaker) claims that the person 
who is described as a rebel fighter is identified as the son of the 
speaker.
 This analysis is compatible with the analysis of the so-called 
ºgeneric" use of a token of ºI".  As the following example shows, 
what the utterer (speaker) states is not only applicable to this 
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utterer (speaker) but also to other people in her/his position, i.e., 
prisoners awaiting capital punishment.  This might show that the 
utterer (speaker) her/himself is not highlighted:
(21) Condemned prisoner: I am traditionally allowed to order 
whatever I like for my last meal.  (Nunberg 1993: 20) 
 This utterance, however, can be analyzed in the way in which 
the utterer (speaker) her/himself is highlighted: the utterer (speaker) 
refers to her/himself as the addresser of the present instance 
of discourse about prisoners' rights, and states that, because of 
what s/he is, s/he can order whatever s/he likes for her/his last 
meal.  The main difference between the generic utterance in (21) 
and those in (17) and (19) is the uniqueness level of the utterer 
(speaker) and the hearer.  In the utterances in (17) and (18), the 
utterer (speaker), the hearer, and the relationship between them 
are such that the statement is true and the utterance makes sense 
in the present instance of discourse.  In (21), on the other hand, the 
uniqueness of the utterer (speaker) which allows her/him to be 
the addresser of the present instance of discourse is her/his being 
a condemned prisoner awaiting capital punishment, and, therefore, 
the utterer (speaker) makes a statement which is not only true 
in the present instance of discourse but also in other instances 
of discourse in which a prisoner in the same situation makes an 
equivalent claim about her/himself.  
5.  Conclusion
 We have analyzed indexicals and clarified how contents 
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of indexicals are expressed by extending Kaplan's analysis of 
indexicals and adopting Benveniste's analysis of deixis.  We 
have also explained how the use of an indexical affects the 
interpretation of the utterance which includes it.  
 We start with the idea that seemingly equivalent utterances 
with a personal pronoun, a proper name, and a definite description, 
which are co-referential, do not seem to express the same 
meaning.  We clarify this using a short conversational exchange 
from the movie Sommersby.  We try to find the source of this 
discrepancy by characterizing the contents of indexicals, and 
clarifying how they are expressed.  Following Kaplan and Corazza 
et al., three entities for indexicals are distinguished: (i) the utterer 
(the speaker)/the hearer/place/time, (ii) the agent (the addresser)/
the addressee/context, and (iii) the referent of a token.  Adopting 
Benveniste's idea that a token of each indexical is identified only 
in terms of the instance of discourse in which it is included, we 
claim that, by a token of ºI" or ºyou", the utterer (speaker) refers 
to what s/he recognizes as her/himself or as the hearer in the 
present instance of discourse.  This affects the interpretation of 
a sentence with ºI" or ºyou" in the subject position, in which the 
utterer (speaker) or the hearer is identified and described in the 
present instance of discourse.  This makes the meaning of the 
utterance unique.   
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